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NOTES
NLRB ORDERS GRANTING UNIONS ACCESS TO
COMPANY PROPERTY
Section 10(c)' of the National Labor Relations Act 2 ("Act" or
"NLRA") grants the National Labor Relations Board ("Board" or
"NLRB") authority to issue orders as remedies for violations of the Act.
The Act's language, however, offers little guidance regarding the scope
of potential remedial orders. The Board recently expanded its class of
available remedial orders to include, in the case of recidivist violators,
the extraordinary remedy of nonemployee access to private company
property. This remedy permits union representatives to enter company
premises to communicate with employees. This Note evaluates the util-
ity of the access remedy by examining the Board's general remedial
powers, by analyzing applicable principles in an organizational setting,
and by summarizing arguments for and against the remedy's use. Fi-




Section 10(c) of the Act 3 grants the NLRB authority to issue orders
remedying unfair labor practices. In the past, the Board had limited
itself to only a few types of remedial orders; ordinarily the remedies spe-
cifically suggested by the language of section 10(c). 4 Under a narrow
1 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
2 National Labor Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1976).
3 Section 10(c) provides:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engag-
ing in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall . . issue. . . an
order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor prac-
tice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of [the Act] ....
National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
4 The most common type of order is reinstatement of a discriminatorily discharged
employee with a back pay award. See R. GORMAN, BASIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZA-
TION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 138 (1976) (asserting that upon finding of discrimina-
tory discharge ordinary order is reinstatement with back pay); D. McDOWELL & K. HuHN,
NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 104 (1976) ("[R]einstatement rights...
are usually automatic."); see also Stephens & Chaney, A Study of the Reinstatement Remedy Under
The National Labor Relations Act, 25 LAB. L.J. 31, 33 (1974) (presenting study in which 217 of
229 discriminatorily discharged employees were ordered reinstated).
Discriminatory discharge of an employee on the basis of the employee's union activity is
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view of its remedial powers, the Board usually issued orders requiring a
party both to cease and desist from the unfair practice and to take ap-
propriate action to ensure that the injured employee was made whole.
Over time, however, the Board experimented with new remedies to
provide relief for atypical unfair practices. Unions had often requested
the Board to grant some form of extraordinary relief against recidivist
violators. The Board had generally been willing to take such action.
For example, the Board had ordered employers to mail notices of the
unfair labor practice ruling to the employees' homes5 or had ordered the
company leaders or NLRB officials to read the Board's order to an as-
sembly of workers. This Note focuses specifically upon one type of ex-
traordinary relief: granting union representatives access to company
property.
6
The Board and the courts have long recognized that stronger meas-
proscribed by § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976), which provides: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization . ... "
5 See, e.g., Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. H.W.
Elson Bottling Co., 379 F.2d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 1967); Marlene Indus. Corp., 255 N.L.R.B.
1446, 1450 (1981); Betra Mfg. Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 1126, 1127, 1137 (1977), enforced, 624 F.2d
192 (9th Cir. 1980); Scott's, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1795, 1807 (1966).
6 See, e.g., Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1980); Textile Work-
ers Union v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896, 903-04 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968); J.P.
Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 304-05 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967);
Marlene Indus. Corp., 255 N.L.R.B. 1446, 1449 (1981). In other cases, the Board has issued
orders directing the company to bargain with the union. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969); NLRB v. Clinton Packing Co., 468 F.2d 953, 954 (8th Cir.
1972).
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ures are required to handle an employer who flagrantly 7 or repeatedly 8
violates the NLRA. Such measures are necessary to ensure that the
Board "carr[ies] out the mandates of § 10(c) of the Act . . .which obli-
gates it to order a proven violator 'to take such affirmative action. . . as
will effectuate the policies of [the NLRA].' ,,
7 Unfair labor practices resulting in extraordinary remedial orders include: enforcing
discriminatory no-solicitation rules; discharging employees for engaging in union activity;
threatening and harassing employees (including threatening employees' personal safety, job
security, and the quality of working conditions); interrogating employees; spying on union
adherents; organizing employees into antiunion groups; and giving employees benefits before
certification elections. See, e.g., NLRB v. Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc., 437 F.2d 290,
297 (5th Cir. 1971) ("aggravated circumstances" warrant extraordinary relief; F.W.I.L.
Lundy Bros. Restaurants, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 415, 416 (1980) (company activities character-
ized as exceptional case marked by "outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor practices);
United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1029 (1979) ("Respondent's unfair
labor practices are. . . so 'outrageous' and 'pervasive' that these conventional remedies will
not suffice to dissipate them and are inadequate to give Respondent's employees sufficiently
explicit reassurances and understanding of their rights under the Act."); John Singer, Inc.,
197 N.L.R.B. 88, 90 (1972) (company's acts were "patently frivolous"). J.P. Stevens & Co.
has received many extraordinary remedial orders from the NLRB in response to repeatedly
flagrant and egregious actions. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 322 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 881 (4th Cir.
1980); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1968); Textile Workers Union v.
NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968); J.P. Stevens & Co. v.
NLRB, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
Since the beginning of the union campaign in 1963, J.P. Stevens & Co. and the NLRB
have waged a continuous legal battle. The courts have employed innovative remedies in
these cases. For commentary on this line of cases, see Figueroa, Development of the Remedial
Power of the National Labor Relations Board in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 23 MERCER L. RE''.
453, 463-66 (1972); KovachJ. P. Stevens and the Strugglefor Union Organization, 29 LAB. L.J. 300
(1978); Note, Labor Law--J. P. Stevens: Searching for a Remedy to Fit the Wrong, 55 N.C.L. REv.
696 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Labor Law]; Note, J.P. Stevens & Co., 163 NLRB No. 24,
46 TEX. L. REv. 397 (1968).
8 It is well established that "[e]vidence of prior unfair labor practices is relevant in
determining the Company's motivation in its subsequent conduct." NLRB v. Clinton Pack-
ing Co., 468 F.2d 953, 954 (8th Cir. 1972); see cases cited supra note 7; see also United Steel-
workers v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 616, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Without doubt the Board has a duty
in a litigated case to employ broader and more stringent remedies against a recidivist than
those usually invoked against a first offender, particularly where normal remedies have
proved to be ineffective after earlier proceedings.") (quoting Containair Sys. Corp. v. NLRB,
521 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir. 1975)); Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 973, 976
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (Board may consider J.P. Stevens & Co.'s "history of recalcitrance"); Maphis
Chapman Corp. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 298, 303 (4th Cir. 1966) ("Evidence of prior unfair labor
practices is relevant. . . ."); Beyerl Chevrolet, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 710, 724 (1975) (continued
violation of the Act led to imposition of "stronger medicine"); Note, Survey of Labor Remedies,
54 VA. L. REV. 696 (1968).
9 Containair Sys. Corp. v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir. 1975). Decaturville
Sportswear Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1969), enforcing Marlene Indus. Corp., 166
N.L.R.B. 703 (1967), is an example of this principle. The defendant employer had committed
more than 20 flagrant violations of the Act. The violations listed by the Board in its order
included: discharging employees for engaging in union activity, encouraging employees to
act violently against union supporters, damaging automobiles and other property of persons
supporting the union, granting employees benefits to interfere with employees' self-organiza-
tional efforts, engaging in surveillance and creating an impression of surveillance of union
activities, interrogating employees, enforcing rules prohibiting employees from distributing
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ACCESS AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL DEVICE
The Supreme Court has never addressed the lawfulness of using
nonemployee access to employer property as a remedial device. The
Court, however, has developed principles for evaluating the propriety of
nonemployee access to employer property for organizational purposes. Al-
though these types of access differ, the principles underlying organiza-
tional access can be applied in the remedial setting.
A union's organizational access is initially determined by the indi-
vidual employer's policy. Some employers, for instance, post rules
prohibiting nonemployee solicitation on their property. These rules
make a union organizational drive difficult because they prevent union
representatives from contacting the employees in common areas where
communication can be facilitated. Unions have alleged that such rules
violate the employees' section 7 rights. 10 Thus, the question presented to
the courts is whether denying access to company property for the pur-
pose of distributing union literature constitutes an unfair labor practice
in violation of section 8(a) (1) of the Act. I I The remedial access issue, in
contrast, arises only after an unfair labor practice has occurred. The
Board's section 10(c) powers enable it to fashion orders to remedy viola-
tions of the Act. The question courts face in this latter context is
whether reasonable access to company property for a limited time is an
appropriate remedial measure.
The organizational access question requires a balancing of two un-
derlying, yet competing principles of American labor law. Section 7 of
the Act guarantees employees the freedom to organize and form unions.
Access can be used as an extremely valuable organizational tool. The
employees' section 7 rights, however, conflict with the employer's pri-
literature and soliciting union support during nonworking time, enforcing in a discriminatory
manner rules prohibiting solicitation, threatening employees with closing or moving 'the
plant, and altering working conditions to interfere with the employees' self-organizational
efforts. 406 F.2d at 888; Marlene Indus. Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. at 706. The Board cited the
employer's history of violent hostility to unionization as justification for imposing the access
remedy. 166 N.L.R.B. at 705.
10 The statute provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3)
of this title.
National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976); see also infra note 23.
11 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in [§ 7]."
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vate property interests and right to maintain production and discipline
standards. 12 In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 13 the Court addressed
these competing interests and formulated two principles to guide the
Board in determining nonemployee access to employer property for or-
ganizational purposes.
A. The Babcock Decision
The Babcock decision involved the distribution of union literature
by nonemployee union representatives on company property.' 4 Bab-
cock & Wilcox Company operated a plant near a community with a
population of 21,000 people. Many of the community's residents
worked for the company. 15 A company rule prohibited nonemployee
organizers from distributing union literature on the plant premises.
Union representatives attempted to distribute campaign literature to
employees at the plant entrance as they drove to and from work because
the company rule and the plant's rural setting made this the only loca-
tion in which they could distribute such material effectively. Distribu-
tion at that location, however, was hazardous and the organizational
strategy ultimately failed.' 6
The union brought suit, alleging that the employer's no-distribu-
tion rule violated the employees' section 8(a)(1) self-organization
rights.' 7 Relying principally upon the Supreme Court's decision in Re-
public Aviation v. NLRB, 18 the Board held that the employer's broad rule
violated the Act. In Republic Aviation, the Court held that a rule prohib-
iting employee distribution of union literature on plant premises was "an
unreasonable impediment" on the freedom of communication essential
12 See in/ia note 24.
13 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
14 The Babcock decision consolidated three separate cases whose facts were not materially
different. See Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 485 (1954), enforcement denied, 222 F.2d 316
(5th Cir. 1955), af'd, 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Seamprufe, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 24 (1954),enforcement
denied, 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1955), affdsub nom. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S.
105 (1956); Ranco, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 998 (1954), enforced per curiam, 222 F.2d 543 (6th Cir.
1955), rev'd sub nom. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
15 Forty percent of the company's employees lived in town and approximately 80% lived
within a 12-mile radius of the plant. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B. at 491.
16 See 109 N.L.R.B. 485, 485 n.3, 492 (1954) (police instructed union to cease distribu-
tion of leaflets at company gate because it was dangerous); Seamprufe, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 24,
29 (1954) (distribution virtually impossible because employees did not stop at gate); Ranco,
Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 998, 1005 (1954) (hazardous conditions hampered distribution and cars
sometimes failed to stop at gate).
17 The union charged that the employer's no-distribution rule impeded the employees'
self-organization rights in violation of § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act. 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . to inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157
of this title . I..." 1d; see supra note 10.
18 See LeTourneau Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, enforcement denied, 143 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1944),
rev'd sub nom. Republic Aviation Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
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to the exercise of employees' rights of self-organization.' 9
The Supreme Court in Babcock denied enforcement of the Board
orders.20 The Court distinguished between the rights of employees and
the rights of nonemployees to distribute literature on company prop-
erty2' and concluded that Republic Aviatzn applied only to employees.
22
The Babcock Court addressed the basic conflict between the organiza-
tional interests of the employees2 3 and the property rights of the em-
ployer.2 4 The Court required an accommodation between these
19 324 U.S. at 804 n.10.
20 The courts of appeals had denied enforcement of the respective Board orders for two
of the three cases decided in the Babcock decision. These courts concluded that nonemployees
have a right of access to the employer's property only if prohibiting access will handicap their
organizing effort. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1955); NLRB
v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1955). Both decisions distinguished Republic
Aviation, because it dealt only with employees' rights to campaign on company property and
nonemplgees did not have these rights. 222 F.2d at 319; 222 F.2d at 860.
In the third case, the court of appeals in a per curiam opinion had enforced the Board's
order, deferring to the Board's findings of fact. NLRB v. Ranco, Inc., 222 F.2d 543 (6th Cir.
1955). The Supreme Court affirmed Babcock and Seamprufe and reversed Ranco. NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 114.
21 The Court stated:
The distinction is one of substance. No restriction may be placed on the
employees' right to discuss self-organization among themselves, unless the em-
ployer can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to maintain production
or discipline. Republic Aviation Corp. . Labor Board, 324 U.S. 793, 803. But no
such obligation is owed nonemployee organizers. Their access to company
property is governed by a different consideration.
351 U.S. at 113.
22 Id at I11.
23 Unions derive their rights during an organizational campaign solely from the employ-
ees' § 7 rights, which include the "full freedom to receive aid, advice, and information from
others, concerning those rights and their enjoyment." Harlan Fuel Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 25, 32
(1937) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The term "others" includes union organizers as
well as fellow employees. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 533-34 (1944); see also Central
Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 542-43 (1971).
Courts have recognized that employees learn principally from union representatives. See
NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's Inc., 372 F.2d 26, 29 (1967) ("[L]acking as [employees] do the
requisite special training and experience, they cannot convey the Union's appeal with any-
thing like the effectiveness of professional union organizers."); see also Hearings Before the Comm.
on Education and Labor of the Senate to Create a National Labor Board, 73d Cong., 2d Sess pt. 1, at
208 (1934); C. DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 421-22 (5th ed.
1941).
The help of nonemployees is beneficial because individual employees are naturally reluc-
tant to take the initiative in actions that may place them in disfavor with their employer.
The employee cannot act with the independence of an outsider. See Note, "Not as a Stranger"
Non-Employee Union Organizers Soliciting on Company Property, 65 YALE L.J. 423, 427 (1956).
24 The employer's private property rights are based on the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution. As an owner of property, the employer has the right to control
the use of his property. The employer also has the economic interests of managing his busi-
ness, preserving plant discipline, and maintaining production. See Republic Aviation Corp.
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945); News-Texan, Inc. v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1970);
United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1956), reo'don other grounds, 357
U.S. 357 (1958); see also Bok, Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
NLRA, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 57 (1964). Employers maintain that outside organizers have no
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conflicting interests so that the protection of one would not effectively
destroy the other.25 The Court held that an employer may promulgate
a rule prohibiting nonemployees from coming onto the employer's prop-
erty if the rule is nondiscriminatory 26 and if alternative channels of com-
munication enable the union to contact the employees.2 7 The Court
concluded that the employers' no-distribution rules did not constitute
unfair labor practices because the union had made some contact with
the employees outside company property. The rule merely forced the
union to rely on alternative methods of publicity.
28
B. Organizational Access since Babcock
The courts since Babcock 29 have interpreted these principles strictly,
requiring only that alternative, nontrespassory means of communication
inherent right to conduct activities on the employer's property. They argue that union or-
ganizers will be unfamiliar to the company supervisory personnel, "and may create problems
of identification, discipline, injury, and security. . . ." R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 185 (1976).
25 The Court required that "[a]ccommodation between [these two interests] be obtained
with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other." NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 112.
26 A no-distribution or no-solicitation rule is nondiscriminatory where it prohibits distri-
bution of literature or solicitation by all nonemployees. In each of the three cases consoli-
dated in Babcock the Board had held the employer's rule to be nondiscriminatory. See
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 485, 492 (1954); Seamprufe, Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 24, 31,
32 (1954); Ranco, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 998, 1007 (1954);seealso Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B.
697, enforced, 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1962).
27 [A]n employer may validly post his property against nonemployee distribu-
tion of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through other avail-
able channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees with its
message and if the employer's notice or order does not discriminate against
the union by allowing other distribution.
351 U.S. at 112. The Court stated, however, that "if the location of a plant and the living
quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to
communicate with them, the employer must allow the union to approach his employees on
his property." Id at 113.
28 The Court emphasized that the union had contacted many employees using other
means of communication such as mailing literature, talking on the street, visiting employees
at their homes, and telephoning employees. Id. at 107 n. 1. The Court also noted the town's
small size and the large percentage of employees living close to the plant. Id at 113.
29 In other factual settings, the Supreme Court has construed Babcock narrowly by hold-
ing that it may be conclusively presumed that the union has a "reasonable" alternative chan-
nel of communication if there is any opportunity, however limited, for contact with
employees. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180, 205 (1978); see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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exist,30 regardless of their effectiveness. 31 Unions have had difficulty
proving the nonexistence of alternative means of communication. The
union must show that it has made a substantial effort to contact the
employees, 32 but almost any degree of contact establishes the existence
of alternative means of access. The Court has recently admitted that
"the balance struck by the Board and the courts under the Babcock ac-
commodation principle has rarely been in favor of trespassory organiza-
tional activity.
'33
In the few cases where the Board granted nonemployees access
under the Babcock rule, the employees generally lived on the employers'
properties, making conventional nontrespassory means of communica-
tion virtually impossible.34 These cases involved resort hotels, 35 an is-
30 For example, in Monogram Models, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 705, 706 (1971), the union
requested that the Board modify its application of Babcock in "big city" situations. The em-
ployer was located in the greater Chicago area. The union cited its inability to use conven-
tional methods of communication, such as mail and mass media, because the employees lived
in such a large area. The NLRB denied unions access to company property citing the exist-
ence of other available, conventional methods of communication. The Board cited the
union's ability to contact employees, albeit with "some difficulty," as they drove into the
plant during rush hour traffic. The Board noted that, "while the plant location unquestiona-
bly presented some obstacles to easy contact with employees on their way to and from work,
such contact was by no means foreclosed. Indeed, it [was] clear that such union efforts...
did reach many employees at these times." Id at 706.
In Falk Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 716, 720 (1972), the Board again required the union to
resort to nontrespassory means of contacting the employees such as the mail, home visits,
telephone, mass media, and handbilling in the vicinity of the plant. The Board cited the
union's ability to obtain the employees' identities by observing employees' license plates and
matching them with state records.
31 This point was directly at issue in May Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962),
enforcement denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963). The employer addressed employees on com-
pany property and company time while enforcing a broad rule against union solicitation on
company property. The Board held that the employer's antiunion speech violated § 8(a)(l),
and found that alternative means of union communication were inadequate without an ac-
cess remedy. Thus the Board granted the union access to company property. 136 N.L.R.B. at
801-02. The court of appeals reversed the Board's decision holding that the Board should
only consider the existence of the alternative means of communication and not attempt to
determine their adequacy. The court stated that "[t]he determination of whether or not the
. ..employer['s] conduct produced an imbalance in opportunities for organizational com-
munications is dependent upon the existence or non-existence of alternative methods of com-
munication open to the Union." 316 F.2d at 799.
32 See Monogram Models, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 705, 706 (1971) ("modest efforts" to con-
tact employees are not sufficient); see also supra note 30.
33 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180,
205 (1978) (footnote omitted).
34 The Babcock Court cited with approval NLRB v. Lake Superior Co., 167 F.2d 147,
152 (6th Cir. 1948) (Board granted unions right of access to contact employees living in tem-
porary lumbering camps and confined by their regular work schedule).
35 See NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (1967) (no effective alternative
means of communication available where 60% of employees lived on employer's premises); see
also H & G Operating Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 719 (1971) (no effective contact where two-thirds
of resort work force lived on premises).
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land mining camp,36 and ships. 37 In other cases involving similarly
isolated employees, courts have denied access by placing a heavy burden
of proof on the union to show that alternative means of access do not




ACCESS AS A REMEDIAL DEVICE
Although courts have established strict rules governing union access
to company property as an organizational device, they have granted un-
ions such access more readily as a remedial measure for employer viola-
tions of the NLRA. It is unclear, however, whether different principles
should govern organizational and remedial access.
A. Arguments Against the Use of Access As a Remedial Tool
1. Babcock Principles Should Be Strictly Applied in the Remedial
Setting
Some courts have strictly applied the Babcock principles by granting
36 See Alaska Barite Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1972).
37 See Belcher Towing Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 446 (1978), enforcement denied, 614 F.2d 446 (5th
Cir. 1980); Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 423 (1973), enforcement denied, 599
F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1979); Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 382
(1971), enforcement denied, 472 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1973).
38 See, e.g., Sioux City, 472 F.2d at 756 (requiring union to "make a very strong showing of
its inability to contact the employees" and holding that access would have resulted in sub-
stantial interference with employer's shipping operation); see also NLRB v. Tamiment Corp.,
451 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1971) (union access to resort hotel denied); NLRB v. Kutsher's Hotel
and Country Club, Inc., 427 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1970) (union access to isolated resort hotel
denied).
39 See, e.g., NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958) (Court consolidated two
cases: NuTone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1955), modijfed sub nom. United Steelworkers v.
NLRB, 243 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1956), reo'd, 357 U.S. 357 (1958) and Avondale Mills, 115
N.L.R.B. 840 (1956), enforcement denied in relevant part, 242 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1975), afd sub
nom. NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357 (1958)). In both cases employers enforced a
rule prohibiting employee distribution of campaign literature on company property and
union solicitation during working time. The rules were justified as necessary to maintain
plant discipline and production. At the same time, each employer engaged in an antiunion
campaign. The Board found that NuTone's actions were noncoercive. The Board, however,
found the Avondale Mills campaign coercive because the employer designed no-solicitation
rules to defeat the employees' organizational efforts and not simply to maintain plant disci-
pline. The Court refused to invalidate the employers' rules, holding that antiunion tactics,
whether coercive or noncoercive, did not make a no-distribution rule unlawful. It upheld the
rules as necessary to serve production, order, and discipline. 357 U.S. at 361. In dicta, the
Court stated that the vital concern was whether "the no-solicitation rules truly diminished the
ability of the labor organizations involved to carry their messages to the employees." Id at
363 (citing Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp., 324
U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945)). The Court stated that the Board must consider the physical charac-
teristics of the area, specifically, the location of the plant and the resources available to the
union. The Court required the Board to examine alternative means of communication before
finding that the employer's rule constituted an unfair labor practice.
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access remedies only if no alternative means of communication are
available to the union. Under this strict approach the courts are reluc-
tant to compromise the employer's property rights in favor of the em-
ployees' self-organizational rights.
40
In Greenfleid Manufacturing Co., 4 1 the employer unlawfully interro-
gated employees, harassed employees distributing handbills, and gave
coercive speeches during working hours. The Board, applying the Bab-
cock principles, refused to grant access to nonemployees, stating that
[t]he purpose of the remedy extended in limited access cases has not
been. . . to provide for a union every facility inside the plant, which
an employer has and pays for, and to make both sides "equal." It is to
provide the union with such opportunity as it would otherwise have to
communicate with employees but for the unavailability of access
outside the plant. . . . [W]here as here it has not been shown that
physical conditions or the employer itself has prevented access, there
is no warrant for directing that employer to remedy a condition for
which it is neither responsible nor liable.
42
Similarly, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. 43 involved an employer hostile to
its employees' organizational activities. The employer had enforced un-
lawful no-solicitation rules, instructed employees to stop engaging in
union activity, and made several unlawful pre-election promises. After,
the conflict between the union and management had persisted for a
number of years,44 the Board granted the union's request for access to
company bulletin boards but denied its request to send organizers onto
the employer's property because alternative means of communication
existed.
45
40 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
41 199 N.L.R.B. 756 (1972).
42 Id at 767.
43 224 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1976), enforced in relevant part, 567 F.2d 1343 (Sth Cir.),er. denied,
439 U.S. 985 (1978).
44 224 N.L.R.B. at 1426.
45 The administrative law judge explicitly refused to balance the effectiveness of the
means of communication available to the union and management:
I would find that an imbalance has been created by Respondent's unfair
labor practices, which would tend to critically impair the Union's opportuni-
ties for effective communication among all but the most militant employee
supporters of the Union .... Yet as illogical as the law may appear in this
regard, under the precedent no weight is accorded to a lack of access attrib-
uted to unfair labor practices; instead, only imbalances attributable to physi-
cal factors are regarded as relevant to the inquiry.
Id at 1459 n.17; see also Heck's, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 886, 887 (1971) (Board denied union
access, but ordered employer to mail notices to employees' homes), enforced in relevant part,
Food Store Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 546. (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 1 (1974); J.P. Stevens & Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 266 (1967), enforcedin relevantpart,
406 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1968).
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2. Sanctions in the Form of Union Access Are at Odds with the Remedial
Focus of the Board's Authority
The Board has authority to grant remedial orders but not punitive
ones. The power of the Board "is to be exercised . . . as a means of
removing or avoiding the consequences of violation[s] . *... "46 The
Board "may not justify an order solely on the ground that it will deter
future violations of the Act."' 47 Thus, for an access order to be valid the
Board must show that it will have the effect of rectifying a current im-
balance created by flagrant employer violations of the NLRA. The
Board may not grant access as a remedy where other appropriate reme-
dies have already been imposed. Granting an access order in such cir-
cumstances constitutes continuing punishment for past occurrences.
Such punishment is beyond the Board's authority. The Board does not
have "virtually unlimited discretion to devise punitive measures . . .
which [it] may think would effectuate the policies of the Act."'48
3. Courts Should Scrutinize Board Orders More Closely
Courts generally give extreme deference to the Board's administra-
tive expertise. With respect to Board remedial orders, however, courts
have been more willing to substitute their own judgment. These courts
reason that they should not necessarily extend the presumption of valid-
ity applied to Board findings of fact to Board remedial orders.4 9 Argua-
bly, courts should scrutinize Board remedial orders more closely,
especially ones which the Board itself classifies as "unconventional.
'50
46 Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961) (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938)).
47 Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136, 147 n.36 (D.C. Cir.) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979).
48 Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11 (1940) (Board order requiring em-
ployer to pay unlawfully dismissed employees' wages to governmental agencies held
punitive).
49 J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 1017, 1028 (4th Cir. 1968) (Boreman, J., con-,
curring in part).
50 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976) (suggesting that court itself should weigh and appraise
Board's remedial orders and deal with them as court sees fit).
Some courts have refused to defer to Board findings in a similar context and have
granted a bargaining order as an extraordinary remedy. See Note, Representative Bargaining
Orders: A Time for Change, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 950, 960-61 (1982); see, e.g., NLRB v. Arrow
Molded Plastics, Inc., 653 F.2d 280, 284 (6th Cir. 1981) ("It is equally inappropriate to en-
force bargaining orders where the Board's rationale for the order was conclusory . . .";
Tipton Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 890, 899 (8th Cir. 1980) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (re-
jecting Board's order because "[Board fell] into the trap of using an easy, mechanical applica-
tion of general rules in a manner that impairs the free choice of the employees'); Rapid Mfg.
Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 144, 151-52 (3d Cir. 1979) (order unenforceable when record lacked
substantial evidence that unfair labor practices were serious enough to undermine majority
strength and impede election process); see also NLRB v. Ely's Foods Inc., 656 F.2d 290, 294
(8th Cir. 1981) (McManus, C.J., concurring) ("I am aware of and approve the legal standard
of review that requires us to give deference to the Board on these matters. But I suggest that
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As the Court stated in Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States."5 1 "Ex-
pert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process, but 'unless
we make the requirements for administrative action strict and demand-
ing, expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster
which rules with no practical limits on itg discretion.' -52
B. Arguments in Favor of the Use of Access As a Remedial Tool
1. Organizational Access May Be Distinguishedfrom Remedial Access
In some instances, employer violations of the Act have led the
Board to grant unions remedial access to company property. 3 In these
cases the Board and the courts have generally found the Babcock princi-
ples inapplicable. 54 For example, in Decaturville Sportswear Co. v. NLRB, 
55
the employer "committed massive unfair labor practices which were, in
substantial part, of a kind deliberately calculated to thwart the Union's
attempts to communicate with employees through the usual chan-
nels."'56 The court approved the Board's access remedy as a tool to di-
rectly counteract the employer's actions. The court explained why
Babcock was not inconsistent with a decision to grant the union access to
company property:
such deference is not warranted where the Board has merely set forth a litany, reciting con-
clusions by rote without any factual explication.").
51 371 U.S. 156 (1962) (Court rejected ICC findings that cease-and-desist order against
union-induced boycott would have been ineffective because of failure to indicate basis on
which it exercised expert discretion).
52 Id at 167 (quoting New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original); see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,
490 (1951) ("Reviewing courts must be influenced by a feeling that they are not to abdicate
the conventional judicial function. Congress has imposed on them responsibility for assuring
that the Board keeps within reasonable grounds.").
53 See Teamsters Local 115 v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 400 (D.C. Cir.) (court upheld Board
order granting union access to nonwork areas during nonwork periods to rectify imbalance
caused by antiunion campaign), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827, 837 (1981); United Steelworkers v.
NLRB, 646 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (court upheld access remedy but required Board to
indicate such access was necessary to offset adverse effects of unlawful employer conduct);
Decaturville Sportswear Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1969); F.W.I.L. Lundy Bros.
Restaurants, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 415, 416 (1980) (Board granted union access to offset unfair
labor practices which had lessened possibility of future fair election); United Dairy Farmers
Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1031 (1979) (Board granted union access to offset pervasive
and flagrant unfair labor practices).
54 Other decisions have addressed the issue of union access to employer property without
any reference to Babcock. Some of these cases have allowed union access, whereas others have
denied access simply because lesser remedies seemed adequate. Compare International Union
of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 230, 232 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (approving order requiring
one hour of company time for union presentation), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904 (1968) with
C.W.F. Corp., 188 N.L.R.B. 554, 560 (1971) (employer's flagrant violations remedied without
ordering access),enforced, Retail Store Employees Local 400 v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
55 406 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1969), enforcing Marlene Indus. Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 703 (1967);
see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56 166 N.L.R.B. 703, 705.
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[In Babcock,] the question was whether denial of access to company
property in order to distribute union literature constituted an unfair
labor practice and the Supreme Court held it did not. Here, the ques-
tion is whether reasonable access to company property for a limited
time is an appropriate remedial measure after a finding of unfair la-
bor practices.
57
Courts confronted with prior violations have thus asserted that union
access can be used to remedy imbalances caused by an employer's unfair
labor practices. 58
2. Courts Should Defer to Board Remedial Decisions
Decisions upholding extraordinary Board remedies frequently refer
to Supreme Court pronouncements of the breadth of the Board's reme-
dial powers. In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 59 the Court
stated that the Board's remedial power "is a broad discretionary one,
subject to limited judicial review."' 60 Furthermore, in NLRB v. Gissell
Packing Co., 61 the Court recognized that "the Board draws on a fund of
knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice of remedy must
therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts."'6 2 These state-
ments, however, conflict with opinions admonishing courts for not ex-
amining Board remedial orders more closely.
63
3. Access Orders Are Remedial, Not Punitive
Board orders must be remedial and not punitive. Courts granting
remedial access have had difficulty articulating this distinction. In
United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 64 the court stated that "[w]hile it is clear
that Board remedies may not be punitive, the Supreme Court has also
stated that Section 10(c) is a broad 'command' that the Board order
such affirmative action as is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
57 406 F.2d at 889.
58 This approach is stated clearly by the Board in Scott's, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1795, 1808
(1966) ("As Respondent violated the rights of those employees who had not yet had a chance
to formulate their desires with regard to representation . . .we deem it appropriate that
employees be afforded further opportunity to engage in organizational efforts.").
59 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
60 Id at 216 (citation omitted).
61 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
62 Id at 612 n.32 (citation omitted).
63 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
64 646 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The United Steelworkers case involved the Florida Steel
Corporation. Since 1974, the Board has found that Florida Steel violated the Act in 17 sepa-
rate cases. In most of these cases the company was found guilty of several unfair labor prac-
tices. In the instant case, the employer committed a minor violation by unilaterally lowering
two employees' wages by 30 cents an hour in violation of an existing collective bargaining
agreement. Id at 619. Notwithstanding the marginal impact of this one violation upon em-
ployee § 7 rights, the court granted union access to counter the substantial chilling effect of
the employer's behavior over the last seven years.
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Act."'65 The Supreme Court stated in NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. 66
that
[i]t is the business of the Board to give coordinated effect to the poli-
cies of the Act. We prefer to deal with these realities and to avoid
entering into the bog of logomachy, as we are invited to, by debate
about what is "remedial" and what is "punitive." It seems more prof-
itable to stick closely to the direction of the Act by considering what
order does. . . and what order does not, bear appropriate relation to
the policies of the Act.
67
Courts dealing with recidivist violators of the Act are susceptible to
charges of imposing access remedies to punish past unlawful behavior.
68
Those courts that have applied remedial measures have argued that in
some situations repeated flagrant violations "may have a cumulative ef-
fect on employees that is greater than the combined effect of each viola-
tion viewed in isolation. '69 Employees may lose faith in the belief that a
union can adequately contend with an employer overtly defying Board
orders. In such cases, union access to employer property may be a neces-
sary remedy. 70 Viewed in the context of an individual violation such an
order may appear punitive. To the extent, however, that the order at-
tempts to "restore the wronged to the position he would have occu-
pied"' 7' had the violation not occurred, it is remedial.
Some courts have expanded remedial measures beyond the actual
locations at which unfair labor practices occurred 72 by applying access
65 Id at 630; see also NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 262 (1969).
66 344 U.S. 344 (1953) (Court affirmed Board's order reinstating 11 discriminatorily dis-
charged employees and approved Board's method of computing back pay awards).
67 Id at 348 (citation omitted).
68 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
69 United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 646 F.2d at 631.
70 Without more stringent Board remedial powers, many firms may find that the bene-
fits of an unlawful campaign outweigh the costs. For example, at one time the Board ordered
J.P. Stevens to pay $1.3 million in back wages. This sum of money is trivial when compared
to J.P. Stevens's estimated savings of $18,400 per hour resulting from remaining a nonunion
company. See Note, Labor Law, supra note 7, at 699 (citing Oversight Hean'ngs on the National
Labor Relations Act Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Educa-
tion and Labor, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1976)).
Commentators have suggested broader use of the Board's § 10(c) powers. See, e.g., Note,
The Need For Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 112 U. PA. L.
REV. 69 (1963). Extensions of the Board's existing powers also have been proposed. See, e.g.,
Note, Coping with Persistent NLRA Violators: The Potential for Debarment Through Executive Order,
66 IowA L. REV. 425 (1981); Note, Remedies for Employer Unfair Labor Practices During Organizing
Campaigns, 77 YALE LJ. 1574 (1968); Comment, Employer Pre-Election Coercion: A Suggested
Approach for Effective Remedial Action, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1112 (1967).
71 Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1029 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846
(5th Cir. 1963).
72 See J.P. Stevens & Co., 623 F.2d 322, 327 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981);
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 881, 882 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 918 (1980);
Gerry's Cash Mkts., Inc. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1021, 1025 (1st Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Jack
LaLanne Management Corp., 539 F.2d 292, 295 (2d Cir. 1976); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v.
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remedies on a company-wide basis. 73 Such orders are similarly suscepti-
ble to the charge that they are punitive in nature. For example, inj.P.
Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 74 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
enforced Board orders that granted the union broad access to all com-
pany plants. 75 The court declined to label the action punitive, stating
that
the Board's order is predicated on its finding that the company em-
ployed its unlawful . . strategy to chill the union's organization of
other plants. The. . . access order is designed to counteract the use
the company has made at other plants of its [previously reported] un-
fair labor practices .... 76
These decisions granting corporate-wide access generally do not discuss
the possible relevance of the Babcock principles, particularly the property
interests of the employer.
77
IV
GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE BOARD DECISIONS
Courts evaluating Board decisions should consider two basic pro-
positions. First, they should recognize that the Board needs a broader
class of remedial orders to handle recidivist violators than is necessary to
regulate one-time violators. Ordinary remedies often are inadequate to
offset the harmful effects of an employer's unlawful antiunion cam-
paign.78 Second, when the Board applies an access remedy it must bal-
NLRB, 463 F.2d 778, 779 (5th Cir. 1972); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 1017, 1021-
22 (4th Cir. 1968); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 304 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1005 (1967); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1547, 1551 (1978); Albert's, Inc., 213
N.L.R.B. 686, 698 (1974), petition for review denied, 543 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976). But see
Wesselman's Enters., Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 1017, 1017 n.2 (1980); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 234
N.L.R.B. 739, 739 n.2 (1978).
73 The Supreme Court has noted that activities at one corporation plant could effect the
corporation's other plants. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263,
275 (1965). In United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 616, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court
noted that corporate-wide remedies should extend to unorganized plants only if the Board
thinks the employer's strategy has chilled the free exercise of employee rights at those plants.
74 623 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
75 The court granted the union access, on a corporate-wide basis, to all nonwork areas of
the plants for the purpose of communicating with employees.
In Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1980), the court also ordered the
employer to provide the union access to all of the recidivist violators' plants, whether or not
specified unfair labor practices occurred at each plant.
76 623 F.2d at 327.
77 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 616, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1981); J.P. Ste-
vens & Co. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); J.P.
Stevens & Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 33 (1979), enforced, 612 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 918 (1981).
78 See Hood, Bargaining Orders: The Ee~ct of Gissel Packing Company, 32 LAB. LJ. 203,
204 (1981) ("Since 1969, the number of unfair labor practice cases filed with the [NLRB] has
increased annually. The ineffectiveness of remedies available to the Board to deal with unfair
labor practices may have encouraged campaign misconduct.") (footnote omitted).
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ance not only the self-organizational interests of the employees, but also
the property interests of the employer. 79 Any workable solution for de-
termining appropriate remedies must accommodate these sometimes
competing propositions. Furthermore, the Board must have guidelines
to decide when an access remedy is appropriate.
To determine the appropriate remedy, the Board should first ascer-
tain whether the employer can be classified as a recidivist and whether
his conduct has substantial coercive effects that may chill the free exer-
cise of employee rights.80 If the Board finds this to be true, it has a duty
to rectify the imbalance between the employer and its employees by en-
abling employees to learn about unionization in an atmosphere free of
further restraint and coercion.8 ' In addition, the Board must recognize
that trained union organizers can play an effective role in equalizing the
balance of power.82 If the Board believes that increased communication
between union representatives and employees will restore the employees'
confidence in their section 7 rights,8 3 the most appropriate remedy may
be to issue a remedial order granting access. The Board also should
consider the private property interests of the employer. The underlying
principles supporting these interests-the fifth amendment and the own-
er's general property rights84 -are unaffected by the employer's actions.
Access remedies are inappropriate if they hinder the company's ability
to maintain plant production and employee discipline. Thus, to protect
these property interests, the Board should use the following guidelines
when granting a right of access to remedy an employer's unfair labor
practices. These guidelines reflect both the Babcock decision and the
rules underlying the Board's remedial authority.
First, the Board should consider the suitability of traditional, non-
trespassory orders,8 5 including the class of remedies suggested by section
79 See United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 646 F.2d at 637 ("Remedial orders granting a
union access to company plants necessarily affect private property rights. .. 2).
80 In United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 646 F.2d at 638, the court stated:
The Act contains a broad command that the Board take such affirmative
action as is necessary to safeguard employee rights and thus effectuate the
policies of the Act. . . . [C]ertain employer conduct may be of such a nature
that some form of union access is needed to dissipate an atmosphere of fear
and helplessness that has been created and to assure employees that funda-
mental rights exist and will be protected.
81 The Board anticipated this goal in United Dairy Workers Coop. Ass'n, 242 N.L.R.B.
at 1029.
82 See supra note 23.
83 Thus the Board should assess the adequacy of the union's available means of commu-
nication. This step contradicts the Babcock doctrine which considers only the existence and
not the adequacy of alternatives. Ste supra note 29.
84 See supra note 24.
85 A proper balance between the need for a meaningful remedial order and the em-
ployer's private property interest leads to the treatment of access as a remedy of last resort.
The courts should not sustain the issuance of an access remedy for unfair labor practices
having only a minor impact upon employees' § 7 rights. Arguably the access remedy will be
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10(c) as well as the more accepted extraordinary remedies. 86 Babcock
dictates that accommodation between the employer's property interests
and the employees' organizational interests "must be obtained with as
little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the
other. '8 7 The Board should not grant the union a right of access if there
are less intrusive ways to protect the employees' rights.88
Second, even where an access remedy is appropriate, the Board's
orders must be remedial, not punitive.89 Remedies granting nonem-
ployees access to company property are extreme. Properly issued access
orders should bear a close and direct relationship to the harmful effects
of the employer's tactics. Thus, repeated minor unfair labor practices
may call only for union access to company bulletin boards, whereas
used most frequently in cases involving recidivist violators of the Act because no other alter-
natives are available for use against employers repeatedly violating traditional and extraordi-
nary remedies. See Thompson & Pollitt, Oversight Hearings of the NLRB: A 1reliminagy Report,
27 LAB. L.J. 539, 54042 (1976) (identifying some "rogue employers" who repeatedly have
committed unfair labor practices and have been subject to numerous Board remedial orders).
86 The United Steelworkers court listed factors applicable in situations involving recidivist
violators. If the access remedy is based on recurring violations, the remedy should be granted
only if the Board evaluates "the seriousness of the violations involved, the amount of time
between violations, and the extent to which employees know or may have reason to know of
past incidents of unlawful conduct." 646 F.2d at 639 n.45. "It is not a history of unlawful
conduct that justifies access as a remedial measure, but rather it is the effects that such a
history may produce." Id It must be "reasonably foreseeable that the employees at these
other locations have suffered coercive effects from the employer's unlawful conduct and that
an access remedy is necessary to cure those effects." Id. at 641. Other courts have suggested
further relevant criteria in determining the applicability of this extraordinary remedy. For
example, apologetic remarks by management may have eliminated any lasting effect of the
employer's misconduct. See, e.g., Peerless of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1121 (7th Cir.
1973) (bargaining order unwarranted where employer's unfair labor practices were
marginal). Moreover, termination of management personnel who committed unfair practices
reduced the likelihood that past misconduct would continue. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pilgrim
Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110, 120 (Ist Cir. 1978). Conversely, employer unfair labor practices
occurring subsequent to the violation in question may demonstrate the employer's continued
unlawful opposition to unionization. See, e.g., Chromally Mining & Minerals Corp. v. NLRB,
620 F.2d 1120, 1131 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980); see also supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
For parallel considerations in the context of a Board decision granting a bargaining or-
der, see Note, supra note 50, at 975 n.127.
87 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
88 This was one of the underlying principles in the United Steelworkers court's decision to
deny enforcement. 646 F.2d at 639. The administrative law judge had concluded that tradi-
tional cease-and-desist orders would remedy the violation. See 244 N.L.R.B. 395, 395 (1979),
rev'd, 646 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
89 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
The Board has also recognized some general limitations on its remedial power under
§ 10(c). For example, a remedy cannot be so broad as to punish a particular respondent or
class of respondents nor can it defeat the Act's other purposes by causing irreparable harm or
hampering meaningful collective bargaining. See Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108
(1970), enforced, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (misrepresentations in union newsletter were
not material enough to warrant overturning election); see also Teamsters Local 115, v. NLRB,
640 F.2d 392, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (denying enforcement of Board order requiring company
president to read notice to employees), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827, 837 (1981).
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more flagrant and persistent violations might justify union access for
organizational campaign speeches. When the Board adheres to this re-
medial constraint, courts should defer to its expertise. The Board, be-
cause of its experience, is best qualified to assess the appropriateness of
particular remedies.90
Third, the Board should carefully guard its neutrality.9 ' It should
strive to restore the status quo that existed at the outset of the organiz-
ing campaign. 9 2 In remedying violations of the Act, the Board must not
unnecessarily change the natural balance of power between union and
management. When necessary, the Board should issue access remedies
to counteract the harmful effects of the employer's actions. Measuring
these harmful effects, however, is difficult and there is large room for
error.93 The Board, therefore, must be careful not to inadvertently
overcompensate the union. Because access remedies are severe, the
Board runs a great risk of violating basic principles of neutrality when
access remedies are improperly granted.
CONCLUSION
This Note has discussed the utility of Board remedial orders that
grant unions access to employers' private property. The present class of
remedial orders needs to be expanded to address the special problem of
recidivist violators. Repeated employer violations of the Act lead to un-
,iatural imbalances in the union-management relationship. Extraordi-
nary remedies such as access to company property are useful in
90 See United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 646 F.2d at 640. Courts also have deferred to the
Board's expertise when granting bargaining orders as an extraordinary remedy. See, e.g., Tip-
ton Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 890, 898 (8th Cir. 1980) ("It is for the Board and not the
courts to make a determination based on its expert estimate as to the effects on the election
process of unfair labor practices of varying intensity."); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.
NLRB, 527 F.2d 803, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (employer refused to bargain with union claiming
majority status). For an extended discussion, see Note, supra note 50, at 960-63.
The Board's broad power in this area is arguably derived from NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). In Gissel the Court stated:
It is for the Board and not the courts, however, to make that determination
[whether to issue a bargaining order], based on its expert estimate as to the
effects on the election process of unfair labor practices of varying intensity. In
fashioning its remedies under the broad provisions of § 10(c) of the Act . . .
the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its
choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts.
Id at 612 n.32 (citation omitted).
91 See Malrite, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 830, 831 (1974) (Board must appear "scrupulously
neutral").
92 See Decaturville Sportswear Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 886, 889 (6th Cir. 1969).
93 The United Steelworkers court was sensitive to the practical problem the Board faces in
establishing that "access is necessary to offset the consequences of unlawful employer conduct
.... Coercive effects are difficult to prove . . . . We believe that the Board may rely on
[its] expertise, and on the cumulative experience of past cases, to presume that certain em-
ployer conduct will inevitably produce certain effects on employees." 646 F.2d at 639.
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rectifying this imbalance and returning the parties to their previolation
status quo.
The courts have adopted varying approaches in evaluating the ac-
cess remedy. The Board, and courts reviewing Board orders, should use
the following guidelines when evaluating the appropriateness of an ac-
cess remedy. The remedy should be used sparingly because of its ex-
treme impact upon private property rights of the employer. This
remedy's proper application requires a balancing of the employer's
property interests and the employees' informational needs. An access
remedy should be avoided where other nontrespassory orders are avail-
able or if the remedy is being applied in a punitive rather than a reme-
dial fashion. Finally, the Board must be careful to remain neutral. The
access remedy should not redefine the balance of power; it should restore
the status quo as it existed before any violations of the Act occurred.
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